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This paper reviews the period leading up to and including the credit disruption of August 
2007 and then examines one failed structured finance issue and one investor in that issue.  
The investor was a financially conservative U.S. state treasury and the issue, Mainsail II, a 
little-known esoteric structure known as a SIV-Lite.  The pairing of these two entities is 
part of the story of the financial crisis and tells us much about the excesses of the markets at 
that time and the lack of investment discipline.  The paper explains the structure of a SIV-
Lite  as  well  as  a  collateralized  debt  obligation  (CDO),  a  structured  investment  vehicle 
(SIV), and an asset-backed commercial paper conduit.  It explores the role of the broker 
and rating agencies in the investment decision. 
. 
Keywords: financial crisis, SIV-Lite, asset-backed commercial paper, investment decision, 
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In August of 2007 the credit markets in the U.S. and much of the world came suddenly and 
calamitously to a near halt.  Amongst the casualties was the asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) issued by a relatively unknown financial structure—a SIV-Lite—called Mainsail II 
which  was  frozen  by  its  trustee  on  August  20,  2007.    Among  the  many  investors  in 
Mainsail II was the state of Maine in the U.S.  The Maine Treasurer’s office had purchased 
$20 million worth of Mainsail II commercial paper just twelve days earlier on August 8, 
2007 for its Cash Investment Pool.  The Cash Pool is a short-term investment portfolio of 
highly rated securities.   
Commercial paper (CP) is rated by one or more rating agencies and highly rated issues 
were considered very liquid and very safe;  the U.S. market is very large, over $1 trillion 
outstanding at this time.  CP is short-term debt, generally limited to a maturity of less than 
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365 days (the maximum maturity is 270 days in the U.S. and 364 days in Europe).
1  In 
practice most CP has a much shorter maturity.  ABCP is a form of senior secured, short-
term borrowing in contrast to corporate CP which is senior unsecured short-term debt.  The 
name  ABCP  derives  from  the  fact  that  ABCP  is  backed  by  the  assets  of  the  issuing 
structure, rather than an ongoing firm.  Yet when revealed to the media several months 
later, this investment in  highly-rated  ABCP  was characterized as a risky investment in 
subprime  mortgages.    The  opposition  political  party  called  the  investment  ‘hasty,’ 
‘careless,’ and a ‘fiscal blunder’” (Cover, 2007). 
The  pairing  of  these  two  entities—a  financially  conservative  short-term  state  cash 
investment portfolio and an esoteric, relatively unknown security—is part of the story of 
the financial crisis.  What is a SIV-Lite and why did this state Treasury (as well as others) 
invest in this security?  What weaknesses in the processes of the investor, the broker, and 
the rating agencies created the circumstances for this pairing of investor and investment?  
Understanding the answers to these questions will aid us in responding to the crisis through 
new regulations, and also understand the limitations of such approaches.             
 
1. The Events of August 2007 
Even before August, 2007 had been a rough year in the capital markets.  The primary area 
of  concern  was  weakness  in  the  U.S.  housing  markets.    According  to  William  Poole, 
President of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, sales of new single-family homes 
began  to decline  following the peak in July 2005 and by late 2006 housing  starts had 
declined to a three-year low (Poole, 2007).  At the same time, mortgage foreclosures also 
began increasing in 2006, climbing above 0.5% for the first time in the 35 year history of 
the data.  January 2007 was the first month in ten years to show a twelve month decline in 
nationwide residential property values. 
Mortgage problems first surfaced in the subprime segment.  Janet Yellen, President of the 
U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, explained what occurred: 
“With  the  benefit  of  hindsight,  it  is  now  apparent  that  underwriting  standards  slipped 
substantially  in  the  United  States  as  house  prices  soared.    For  example,  permissible 
combined  loan-to-value  ratios  edged  up  during  2005  and  2006.    And  no-  or 
low-documentation loans—so-called “stated income” loans—became more prevalent. Such 
loans might have performed reasonably well if house prices had continued to rise, but once 
house prices leveled off and then began to decline, the stage was set for trouble” (Yellen, 
2008). 
With little attention, in February 2007 HSBC and New Century Financial announced larger 
than anticipated losses from rising defaults of subprime mortgages in the United States 
(Barker, 2007).  By March 2007 the housing bubble, as we now view it, had burst—home 
prices started to noticeably decline and over 20 subprime lenders were bankrupt or close to 
it (over 100 would fail or cease operating over the year).  In mid-June, two Bear Stearns 
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hedge  funds  collapsed  due  to  the  mortgage  crisis  (eventually  to  declare  bankruptcy  on 
August 1, 2007).  In mid July, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s each downgraded 
over  400  or  more  residential  mortgage  backed  security  (RMBS)  classes  (Stein,  2007). 
Significantly, Moody’s had downgraded 558 total RMBS by this point of 2007, which were 
held in 294 collateralized debt obligations (CDOs;  see discussion later about CDOs).  On 
July  24  the  largest  American  mortgage  originator  (as  of  2006)  Countrywide  Financial 
Corporation  announced  that  subprime  mortgage  problems  had  spread  to  its  prime 
mortgages.  On July 30, a German Bank IKB Deutsche Industriebank had to be bailed out 
because  of  mortgage  problems,  illustrating  the  global  nature  of  these  markets.    Fed 
President Poole estimates that foreigners held as much as $150 billion in securities backed 
by subprime mortgages (Poole, 2007).   
Despite the market jitters entering August 2007, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) on August 7 did not make any adjustment to the Fed 
Funds target rate, keeping it at 5.25%.  While its statement that day referred to volatile 
financial markets, tightening credit, and a housing “correction,” it expected the economy to 
continue a moderate expansion, “supported by solid growth in employment and incomes 
and  a  robust  global  economy”  (FOMCa,  2007).    But  a  day  earlier  American  Home 
Mortgage, the tenth largest U.S. mortgage lender, had filed for Chapter 11 protection.  On 
August 9 another large American mortgage lender, American International Group, echoing 
Countrywide  earlier,  announced  that  mortgage  defaults  were  spreading  beyond  the 
subprime market.  French bank BNP Paribas suspended three investment funds worth 2 
billion Euros, citing U.S. mortgage problems:  “It said it was ‘impossible to value certain 
assets’ in an uncertain market” (BBC News Online, 2007).  This news roiled markets and 
the Fed was forced to act.  Two days after it had referred to the “robust global economy” it 
began  pumping  billions  of  dollars  into  the  economy.    The  August  10,  2007  FOMC 
statement said:  “The Federal Reserve  will provide reserves as necessary through open 
market  operations  to  promote  trading  in  the  federal  funds  market  at  rates  close  to  the 
Federal Open Market Committee's target rate of 5-1/4 percent” (FOMCb, 2007).
2  Such 
interventions were also undertaken by central banks in Europe and elsewhere. 
The rating agencies announced a series of substantial downgrades of highly rated tranches 
of subprime MBS as delinquencies increased.  “These downgrades raised concerns not only 
about mortgage-backed securities themselves, but also about the quality of rating agencies’ 
evaluations of risk in other structured credits.  As a result, investors grew wary, as they had 
trouble knowing what risks were embedded in these instruments, how to price the risks, and 
who would ultimately bear the risks.  The consequence is that the markets for many such 
assets are now highly illiquid and all but closed for new business” (Yellen, 2008).   
The commercial paper market, usually considered a low-risk, highly liquid market, was 
virtually drying up overnight. As evidence, consider that outstanding CP dropped over 16% 
in about two weeks and 25% by mid-October, reflecting the lack of new paper to replace 
maturing paper.  Investors were dumping all mortgage-related assets, not just subprime 
issues.  As Stuart Graham of Merrill Lynch would say in a note to clients: “We believe that 
investors and bank managers themselves are suffering from a crisis of confidence.  Put 
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simply, nobody knows where the subprime problems are buried.  Banks are worried what 
dangers lurk in each other's books.  As such, the dispersion of risk—which we had hoped 
would be a good thing—has come to be seen as a major cause of the current problems" 
(quoted in Kennedy, 2007).   
The entities that funded primarily with commercial paper, in particular SIVs, SIV-lites, and 
bank conduits (see discussion later) were particularly hard hit;  all fund long maturity assets 
with short-term commercial paper.  Banks were hard hit as well.  The conduits and SIVs are 
separate legal entities, but banks often support them with backup lines of credit or liquidity 
facilities, and also often manage the assets.  If the assets of the SIV or conduit cannot be 
sold (as in the environment of August 2007), the bank will have to fund the line of credit or 
the  liquidity  facility.    In  many  cases,  as  explained  by  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  San 
Francisco President Yellen, banks are concerned about reputational capital:  “When the 
SIVs were in danger of failing, the banks were concerned about reputational effects and 
decided to rescue them by taking the underlying assets back onto their own balance sheets. 
Furthermore, as investors have pulled back from the markets for asset-backed securities, the 
value of these securities and CDOs has fallen dramatically, so banks and other financial 
institutions have had to write down their values, which has shrunk their capital” (Yellen, 
2008). 
A sharp contraction in the ABCP market is a significant event.  The ABCP market is huge, 
representing the majority of the CP market.  The U.S. ABCP market hit its all-time peak the 
week ending August 10, 2007, with $1,173.4 billion in outstandings.  This represented 54% 
of total CP outstanding.
3  In addition to ABCP, the CP market consists of financial CP and 
non-financial  CP.    Financial  CP  is  issued  by  firms  like  auto-finance  companies.  Non-
financial CP, what we consider standard corporate CP, represents a bit less than 10% of 
total CP.  ABCP outstanding had stood at $630.5 billion in August 2004; thus it had almost 
doubled in three years. The European ABCP market also had grown rapidly, from Euro 50 
billion in 1998 to Euro 550 billion in 2007, equivalent to about $748 billion (Kennedy, 
2007). 
On  August 16, S&P issued  a  warning about possible rating downgrades of several CP 
issuers, Countrywide Financial drew down its credit lines after being unable to raise funds 
in the markets, and the Fed reduced the discount rate by 50 basis points (bp) to 5.75% (it 
did not change the Fed Funds target rate).
4  In the ongoing flight to quality by money 
market managers in particular, yields on Treasuries dropped reflecting increased demand, 
while required yields on CP and subprime debt soared.  One-month T-bill rates declined 
145 bp by August 16.  But rates on ABCP rose to levels not seen since September 11, 2001.  
The high end of the spread to 1 month LIBOR was 5 bp on August 3, widened to 35 bp by 
August 10, 50 bp by August 17, and 65 bp by August 31 (Credit Suisse Securities, 2007).  
The spread of ABCP to CP also increased;  the spread on top rated 1 month ABCP over top 
rated financial CP was 6 bp at the end of July; by August 24 it was 72 bp and by August 30 
it was 96 bp (Weiseman and Greenlaw, 2007). 
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In the midst of this increasingly volatile and illiquid market, Mainsail II SIV-Lite ran into 
trouble.  On  August 20, Mainsail II  was  unable to raise sufficient funds in the  ABCP 
market and it announced it may have to sell assets.  Mainsail II’s manager Solent Capital 
“said in a regulatory statement that funding difficulties in the CP market meant Mainsail II 
had been forced to draw on liquidity facilities from banks, which were expensive and ‘may 
cease to be available’” (Davies and Politi, 2007).  The backup liquidity funding consisted of 
a total of $556 million from Barclays, which was insufficient, and unfortunately there was 
little interest in the market in purchasing Mainsail II’s U.S. mortgage related assets.  A 
statement from Mainsail II said: “Current market volatility and lack of market liquidity 
with respect to sub-prime lending markets have caused adverse conditions with respect to 
the  liquidity  and  market  risk  exposures  on  the  Company’s  underlying  portfolio  of 
investments” (Solent Capital, 2007).  The inability to raise funds in either the U.S. or Euro 
commercial paper markets coupled with the inability to sell assets caused a market value 
coverage test to fail, which was a trigger or enforcement event that signaled a wind-down 
of the structure. A wind-down means that the collateral manager will redeem outstanding 
liabilities as they become due and cannot issue new CP or notes.  Mainsail II’s trustee, the 
Bank of New York, froze the assets on August 20.  Mainsail II had thirty days to liquidate 
its  portfolio.    This  contractual  arrangement  is  designed  to  protect  the  investors,  but  it 
depends on a ready market for the portfolio assets.  The wind-down also requires a closing 
out of hedge positions possibly at a loss.  The lack of buyers in the ABCP market affected 
other firms on August 20.  Thornburg Mortgage Company of the U.S. and HBOS (the 
largest mortgage lender in the UK) also could not roll over CP that day.   
Shortly thereafter, on August 22, ratings were cut on Mainsail II securities to junk status.  
Its highest rated mezzanine notes fell from AAA to CCC+, the tier 2 notes to CCC, and the 
capital notes to CCC- (by S&P).  The ABCP was dropped by Moody’s from Prime 1 (P 1) 
to “not prime,” its short-term non-investment grade.  S&P dropped the ABCP to A-3.  One 
day later S&P further lowered the ratings, to B (junk status) for the ABCP, and CC for the 
mezzanine notes and capital notes.  The securities, such as the ABCP held by the State of 
Maine, were unsellable and would not mature as scheduled on August 31, 2007. 
 
2.  The SIV-Lite Structured Credit 
Mainsail II is characterized as a SIV-Lite, a type of structured credit product.  Structured 
credit is “the process of taking plain vanilla credit instruments and ‘structuring’ them to 
meet certain [investment] goals” such as diversification, payment redistribution, hedging, 
profiting from the yield curve, and many others (Mahadevan, et al., 2006).  In 2007 SIV-
Lites  were  relatively  recent  financial  structures  (the  first  SIV-Lite  was  Wharton  Asset 
Management’s $2 billion issue H2 Finance in 2004) and relatively rare—as of August 2007 
only five SIV-Lites had been launched (Davies, 2007).   
A  SIV-Lite  bears  similarities  to  other  structured  products  such  as  a  SIV  (structured 
investment vehicle), an ABCP Conduit and a CDO but there are important differences as 
well.  All of these structures perform a similar act of intermediation—buy assets funding 
primarily with some sort of debt, usually commercial paper.  At the center of the structure, 
as with all securitizations, is a special purpose vehicle (SPV), set up to be “bankruptcy 
remote”  to  insulate  the  structure  from  problems  in  the  originator  of  the  securities  it 
purchases.  The SPV is a limited purpose company (limited to issuing CP and purchasing AE  Prudent Intesting? The Credit Crisis of August 2007 Mainsail II Siv-Lite, and the 
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assets),  organized  as  a  corporation  (the  most  common  structure),  trust,  limited  liability 
corporation or partnership, or a limited partnership (Bate, et al., 2003).  Some of the SPVs 
have a defined limited life; others have no maturity but instead are continuous operating 
companies.  See Table no. 1 for a summary of the structures. 
  Table no. 1:  Structure Characteristics 
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In the case of ABCP financing of these structures, there is a liquidity facility, ranging from 
5% to 100% of the CP liabilities.  A liquidity facility is a commitment to lend to the SPV or 
purchase assets from the SPV if funds are needed to repay maturing commercial paper.  
This is normally to protect against a timing problem, when new CP sales have not settled in 
time to repay the maturing CP issues.  Liquidity facilities typically will not advance against  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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defaulted assets (those default are covered by credit enhancement).  Credit enhancement 
can be external (e.g., a letter of credit) or internal (subordinate or lower rated tranches 
which face the first losses) and can be as high as 100%, but is typically much lower.  All 
these structures have some sort of investor protections that are “triggered” by one of several 
negative events (such as a value test where value of assets falls below value of liabilities, a 
cash flow test where incoming cash flow cannot service liability interest requirements, or a 
quality test where the diversification and credit quality of the portfolio is insufficient).  The 
trigger may signal a redirection of cash flows, portfolio trading restrictions, or even a wind-
down of the structure as with Mainsail II. 
The  distinctions  among  the  structures  can  be  separated  into:    asset/liability  structure, 
liquidity  coverage  and  credit  enhancements,  defined  life  of  the  SPV,  and  sponsorship.  
There is no clear line between any of these structures, thus Mainsail II is referred to as a 
SIV-Lite and a cash CDO. Because all of these structures are not fully understood and 
because of their similarities and differences, it is worth reviewing them.   
An ABCP conduit is a bankruptcy remote SPV—the conduit—that issues ABCP to fund the 
purchase  of  various  assets  such  as  trade  receivables,  auto  leases,  equipment  leases, 
consumer loans, and sometimes mortgages.  The conduit has an ongoing, indefinite life. 
Generally, ABCP conduits are sponsored by a bank or other financial institution, which 
often also administers the conduit.  An institution is a “sponsor” if it has a financial stake in 
the program, although it does not own the program (Office of Thrift Supervision, 2005).  A 
conduit is a way for a bank to provide alternative funding for clients, as a way to move 
assets off balance sheet (which can improve capital ratios), and as a way to profit from a 
yield  curve  spread.    A  single-seller  conduit  buys  assets  from  one  seller,  a  multi-seller 
conduit deals with more than one seller, and a securities-backed conduit (also known as a 
securities-arbitrage conduit) buys publicly rated securities (AAA to AA-) including asset-
backed, mortgage-backed, and corporate securities. 
ABCP conduits were first established in the mid 1980s and have survived the crisis due to 
their liquidity facilities and (often) an implicit sponsor guarantee.  At year-end 2007 there 
were estimated to be 320 active ABCP conduits with CP outstanding of $967 billion (Fitch 
Ratings,  2008).    ABCP  conduits  have  100%  liquidity  facilities  to  ensure  the  timely 
repayment of CP in the event that the conduit cannot issue or refinance its CP.  However, 
the liquidity facility will not protect investors against assets in default.  ABCP conduits 
usually have up to 7% credit enhancement in the form of a letter of credit by the sponsor, 
overcollateralization, loss reserves, or a third-party guarantee.  “Therefore conduit investors 
are exposed to the default risk on the underlying assets but are not exposed to the market 
value (or price) risk of those assets” (Fitch, 2007).   
A structured investment vehicle (SIV) also consists of a bankruptcy remote special purpose 
vehicle, also with an indefinite life.  It is similar to a securities-arbitrage ABCP conduit in 
that  it  invests  in  highly  rated  securities  and  makes  income  by  arbitraging  short-term, 
cheaper funding with long-term higher yielding assets.  However, the SIV is funded with a 
combination of CP, medium term notes (MTNs), and capital notes, with the majority CP.  
The CP and MTNs are highly rated (P-1 or F1
5 for the CP and AAA for the MTNs).  The 
capital notes provide the credit enhancement for the senior investors. 
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SIV investments consist of AAA/AA structured securities, corporate and sovereign bonds, 
and subordinated bank debt with on average a weighted average life of four years, versus a 
weighted-average life of the liabilities of one year (Fitch, 2008).  Note that most SIVs 
operate with the support of a 5-10% liquidity facility, unlike the 100% facility in a conduit 
structure.
6  The bank or investment company that manages the SIV does not necessarily 
provide  any  liquidity  support  or  credit  enhancement  (such  as  we  find  with  conduits).  
During illiquid periods such as August 2007, there was an inability to issue new CP to fund 
maturing CP.  ABCP conduits were able to draw on their liquidity facilities and all conduit 
ABCP  was  repaid  when  due.    SIVs,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not  have  100%  liquidity 
facilities.  When the SIVs were unable to roll over their CP, they were forced to sell assets 
at a loss.  Moreover, the market value declines of the assets caused them to breach market 
value tests (and some liquidity tests), thus triggering an enforcement event which froze the 
structure. 
The first SIVs were developed in the late 1980s.  As of mid 2007 there were 28 SIVs with 
assets  totaling  about  $400  billion.    By  late  2007  seven  of  those  SIVs  had  entered  an 
enforcement state and assets under management had dropped to $190 billion. 
While a SIV is similar to a security-arbitrage ABCP conduit, it can also be seen as a form 
of  a  market-value  CDO  (Collateralized  Debt  Obligation).    A  CDO  is  an  SPV  which 
purchases a group of assets (securities, not pools) and issues securities (such as bonds) to 
finance the assets.  The typical CDO funds longer-term than the other structures examined 
here.  The assets can consist of investment grade or high-yield corporate loans, investment 
grade or high yield bonds, commercial real estate debt, and structured finance securities 
such  as  RMBS  (real  estate  mortgage-backed  securities),  CMBS  (commercial  mortgage-
backed securities), CMOs (collateralized mortgage obligations), ABS (non-mortgage asset-
backed securities), and other CDOs.  Well over 50% of the assets of CDOs purchased in the 
few years before 2007 were in structured assets (SIFMA, 2008).  CDOs that invest in other 
CDO  securities are dubbed CDO-squared, and if a CDO invests in CDO-squared, it  is 
dubbed  CDO-cubed.    A  CDO  funds  by  issuing  securities  with  similar  maturity 
characteristics as the underlying collateral.  The liabilities are credit “tranched” (senior, 
junior, equity) with equity notes taking the first loss, then junior notes, and only then senior 
notes.
7  The first CDO was issued in 1987, arranged by Drexel Burnham Lambert.  At year-
end 2006 the market was estimated at $2 trillion outstanding world-wide. 
                                                 
6 S&P says:  “Unlike other areas of structured finance, in SIV transactions 100% liquidity facilities 
are not required as the SIV is subject to many stringent tests and constraints and benefit can be given 
to the liquidity of the assets that it holds” (S&P, 2002). In an SIV, the liquidity lines are generally to 
address the normal mismatch of timing between repayment of liabilities as they fall due and issuing of 
new liabilities.  “Standard & Poor's considers it important that each SIV have an appropriate mix of 
liquidity lines from external providers and internal liquidity to be able to repay some level of its short 
maturing liabilities when they  fall due.”  The “many stringent tests” include weekly surveillance 
reports to the rating agencies with the various test results and portfolio characteristics. 
7 There are many types of CDOs.  A "cash" CDO implies that the SPV owns actual cash assets like 
bonds  and  loans  and  the  investors  are  paid  principal  and  interest  from  the  asset  cash  flows.    A 
"synthetic" CDO instead invests in derivatives like credit default swaps.  Some tranches in a synthetic 
CDO may be “funded tranches” implying that they are collateralized by extremely low-risk assets 
such as Treasury bonds.  This is similar to a credit-linked note.  A cash-flow CDO pays liabilities 
with the interest and principal cash flows from the assets.  A market value CDO supports liabilities  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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A SIV-Lite like Mainsail II has similarities to all the structures discussed.  Like a SIV, a 
SIV-Lite buys high quality assets while funding with cheaper CP and MTNs.  Because 
most of the liabilities are short-term CP with maturities less than the assets, the SIV-Lite 
attempts to profit from the maturity mismatch (also similar to a securities-arbitrage ABCP 
conduit).  However, unlike a SIV or a conduit, a SIV-Lite has a fixed quantity of liabilities 
and a finite life. A SIV and a conduit are operating companies which continuously purchase 
assets and issue liabilities.  Thus in its limited life a SIV-Lite is similar to a cash CDO;  
however, CDOs fund longer-term.  Both SIVs and SIV-Lites operate with less than 100% 
liquidity facilities covering their short-term liabilities, unlike a conduit. 
What all this means is that while a SIV-Lite does have some similarities with somewhat 
older, more familiar structures; it is the next step in an evolution to more risky structures.  It 
has a serious mismatch problem between the longer maturity assets and shorter maturity 
liabilities; as we will see in the Mainsail structure it operates with a small liquidity facility 
and  limited  credit  enhancement;  there  is  no  sponsor  or  manager  guarantee,  implicit  or 
otherwise. 
 
3.  The State of Maine Cash Pool and the Investment in Mainsail II   
Among the many functions of the Office of the Treasurer of the State of Maine is cash 
collection and management, including short-term investment of funds not needed to pay 
bills.
8  The investment component is through the Treasurer’s Cash Pool Portfolio, where 
excess state revenues are invested for the short-term.  Because funds in the cash pool must 
be available to pay state expenses, desired investments are short term and conservative (low 
risk).  The investments are governed by both state statute and an investment policy.  The 
statute (Title 5, Part 1, Chapter 7, §135) limits investments to deposits in highly rated banks 
and to safe and liquid securities such as U.S government and U.S. government agency 
securities, prime commercial paper, and corporate bonds rated "AAA," none of which can 
have a final maturity of more than 36 months (most of the investments are for much shorter 
time periods). 
The  investment  policy  more  specifically  identifies  the  securities  and  specifies  the 
investment  objectives,  in  descending  order  of  priority:  preservation  of  capital  and 
protection of investment principal; maintenance of sufficient liquidity to meet anticipated 
cash  flow  needs;  diversification  to  avoid  unreasonable  market  risks;  attainment  of  a 
competitive rate of return.  Clearly safety and liquidity are important objectives; however, 
the yield on the portfolio provides additional revenue to the state and thus return is also a 
factor when choosing investments.  In the previous fiscal year (2006-2007) the pool earned 
the  state  $34  million.    At  the  end  of  July  2007  the  portfolio  had  a  market  value  of 
$719,013,105.  The weighted average maturity of the portfolio was 83 days; 82% of the 
                                                                                                                            
through  the  value  of  the  collateral,  requiring  more  frequent  trading.    For  more  information  see 
Mahadevan, et al., 2006. 
8 The office of the Treasurer performs other varied duties, including important operational functions 
such  as  management  of  37  State  of  Maine  bank  accounts,  receipt  of  all  State  revenues,  and 
distribution of over two million vendor and payroll checks, as well as 506,000 electronic payments 
each year.  The Treasurer also issues the state's general obligation bonds and coordinates Maine's 
presentations to bond rating agencies. AE  Prudent Intesting? The Credit Crisis of August 2007 Mainsail II Siv-Lite, and the 
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portfolio had a maturity less than 90 days and only 9.39 % had maturities above 1 year 
(Table no. 2). 
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Table  Notes:    Cash  and  cash  equivalents  consist  of  interest  bearing  deposits  at  two  banks;  
Repurchase  agreements  are  with  the  Farm  Credit  of  Maine  and  are  collateralized  with  U.S. 
Treasuries (this is a part of the “Linked Investment Program for Agriculture”); CP consists of 20 
separate  investments  in  high  rated  asset  backed  commercial  paper.    By  policy,  no  single  CP 
investment can exceed 20 million; there are 24 CDs with 14 banks, all either headquartered in Maine 
or with offices in the state; U.S. Treasuries consist of two Treasury notes maturing in 3 and 6 months; 
U.S. instrumentalities consist of securities issued by GSEs (Government Sponsored Enterprises) (e.g., 
FHLMC (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp) known as Freddie Mac, Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA), Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB), Federal Farm Credit Banks (FFCB); the 
corporates are all issued by GE Capital or Toyota Credit; all securities are rated AAA, A-1, or A-1+.   
 
 
CP (which includes ABCP), which made up 29% of the portfolio in late July, had been a 
significant part of the cash pool portfolio for decades, according to state Treasurer, David  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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Lemoine.    There  does  not  appear  to  have  been  any  prior  CP  default  in  the  portfolio.  
Treasurer  Lemoine  refers  to  CP  investing  as  a  “3-tiered  investment  screening  process” 
(Lemoine, 2007).  By this he means that any CP investments are made under the guidance 
of the investment advisor (MBIA Asset Management Group), suggested and transacted by a 
limited  group  of  eleven  approved  broker  dealers,  and  must  have  the  highest  CP  rating 
available by 2 of the 3 rating agencies (Moodys, S&P, Fitch).  The investment advisory 
firm, MBIA Asset Management Group, had no role in this investment.  They did provide a 
market report dated July 31, 2007 which expressed concern about the  “struggling  U.S. 
housing market” but gave no inkling of the crisis in the credit markets to come (MBIA, 
2007).  The broker recommending and completing the Mainsail II transaction was Merrill 
Lynch. 
The investment in Mainsail II appeared to meet the investment standards of the statute and 
the investment policy—highly rated, short-term, small in proportion to the total portfolio.  
The $20 million investment represented less than 3% of the pool.  At the time of purchase, 
it was rated P1 (Prime 1) by Standard and Poor’s and A1+ by Moody’s, the commercial 
paper equivalent of a triple-A rating.  It was short-term--the paper was scheduled to mature 
on August 31,2007 for $20,000,000, just 23 days after its purchase.  In addition, this was a 
somewhat familiar security.  On July 31, 2007 Treasury had invested $4 million overnight 
in Mainsail II, with the principal and interest being paid in full on August 1. 
The paper had a promised yield, on an annualized basis, of 5.45%.
9  As a point of reference, 
the yield on a 1-month T-Bill was 5.04% when Mainsail II was purchased on August 8, 
2007 (Table no. 3). The discount yield on the 23 day Mainsail II investment offers an 18 
basis point (bp) premium to one-month financial and nonfinancial CP as reported by the 
Federal Reserve, 5.45% to 5.27%.  Note that ABCP always sells at a premium to non-
ABCP.  Poole indicates that rates on ABCP had increased only a few basis points prior to 
August  9  (Poole,  2007).    On  August  3  Credit  Suisse  reported  that  typical  ABCP  was 
yielding 5.35-5.4% (Credit Suisse Securities, 2007).  Thus Mainsail II offered a somewhat 
attractive return but not one out of the ordinary. 
Table no. 3:  Selected Interest Rates (% annualized) on 8-8-2007 
Mainsail II Discount Yield (23 days to maturity)  5.45 
1 month CP Non-Financial AA  5.27 
1 month CP Financial AA  5.27 
1 month ABCP (high end)  5.40 
1 month Jumbo CD  5.36 
1 month Eurodollar deposit  5.37 
1 month U.S. Treasury Constant Maturity  5.04 
1 month dollar Libor  5.35 
Fed Funds Rate (target)  5.25 
 
Table  Notes:    All  rates  except  as  indicated  following  are  from  Federal  Reserve  available  at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.   
                                                 
9 Commercial paper yields are expressed on a discount basis assuming a 360 day year.  This discount 
yield is equivalent to a bond equivalent yield of 5.545%. AE  Prudent Intesting? The Credit Crisis of August 2007 Mainsail II Siv-Lite, and the 
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AA CP is the Fed's indication of highly rated CP, that is, programs with no ratings less that A-1.  
LIBOR rate is from CLP Structured Finance available at www.swap-rates.com.  CP yields and T-Bill 
yields are on a discount basis assuming a 360 day year.  Financial CP does not include ABCP. 
 
Mainsail II had first been issued in July, 2006.  Its assets are entirely composed of asset-
backed securities (ABS, securities backed by other securities) including RMBS and other 
CDOs.  The Mainsail structure is illustrated in Figure no. 1.   
   
 
Figure no. 1:  Mainsail II SIV-Lite Transaction Structure 
Source:  Standard & Poor’s Cash CDO Of ABS Presale Report: Mainsail II Ltd. And 
Mainsail II LLC, 6-13-2006 
 
The  securities  are  issued  by  two  special  purpose  vehicles,  limited  liability  companies 
established in the Cayman Islands (Mainsail II Ltd.) and Delaware (Mainsail II LLC).  The 
sole purpose of these SPVs are to acquire the portfolio assets and issue commercial paper 
and notes.  The transactions and the SPVs are managed by Solent Capital (Jersey) Ltd, 
established  in  Jersey,  an  off-shore  financial  Center  located  off  of  Normandy  but  a 
dependency of Britain.  Solent Capital Limited is in turn advised by Solent Capital Partners 
LLP, a British entity.  Solent Capital Partners was founded in 2003 by Jonathan Laredo 
(formerly responsible  for European and Asian structured  finance at JP Morgan  Chase), 
Geoff Smailes (formerly responsible for trading and capital allocation at Credit Suisse First 
Boston), and Tim Gledhill (formerly responsible for structured trading credit at Merrill 
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Mainsail II had an allowable maximum portfolio size of $4.519 billion (the "platform") to 
be funded by commercial paper and notes (Table no. 4).  At the time of issue the asset size 
of the fund was about $1.5 billion, with a ramp-up to about $2 billion in 12 months to 
follow.  While the CP could be issued in varying maturities, in practice the goal was to 
issue  CP  with  approximately  30  day  maturities  to  match  the  repricing  on  the  variable 
pricing assets.  The medium term notes had an initial five-year maturity, with a plan to 
refinance those notes with another five-year issue. There is a maximum investment period 
of eight years (after which wind-down begins).  Investments must be made in AAA or AA 
rated RMBS, ABS, CMBS, or CDOs of ABS (CDOs that have invested in ABS).  At least 
45% of these securities must be rated AAA.  Note that no more than 25% of the portfolio 
can be in other CDO securities (Table no. 5). It is possible for the asset portfolio to be 
almost entirely in tranches (securities) from pools backed by low rated securities even if 
most of those securities are rated AA or higher because the maximum concentration in B/C 
RMBS is 90%. The actual assets of Mainsail II as of 2008 after the structure was frozen are 
listed in the appendix. It is clear that most of the investments are from subprime mortgage-
backed RMBS. The rest are in CDOs and alt-A mortgage related assets (an alt-A mortgage 
is between a sub-prime and a prime mortgage). 
Table no. 4:  Proposed Funding Composition (Presale Report) 
Class  Rating 
$ 
(mill) 










paper  A 1+  4000  88.5%  11.5  0-364 days  na 
Tier  1 
mezzanine 
notes  AAA  271  6.0%  5.5  5 years  2016 
Tier  2 
mezzanine 
notes  AA  136  3.0%  2.5  5 years  2016 
Capital notes  BBB-  112  2.5%  0  na  2020 
Source:    Standard  &  Poor’s Cash  CDO  Of  ABS  Presale  Report:  Mainsail  II  Ltd.  And 
Mainsail II LLC, 6-13-2006 
 
Table no. 5:  Maximum Allowable Concentrations (%) by Asset Value 
RMBS B/C  90 
ABS Home equity loan securities  60 
MBS Agency securities, RMBS A  50 
CMBS  conduit  securities,  CMBS  credit  tenant  lease  securities,  CMBS 
large loan securities, CMBS single asset securities 
30 
CDO Securities  25 
ABS equipment leasing, ABS equipment leasing, ABS equipment leasing, 
ABS trade receivables securities, Auto ABS, Credit card securities, Dealer 
floor plans, Student loan securities 
10 AE  Prudent Intesting? The Credit Crisis of August 2007 Mainsail II Siv-Lite, and the 
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Source:    Standard  &  Poor’s Cash  CDO  Of  ABS  Presale  Report:  Mainsail  II  Ltd.  And 
Mainsail II LLC, 6-13-2006. 
 
 
As  of  July  31,  2007,  Mainsail  II  had  a  $2.024  billion  portfolio  with  49.22%  in  AAA 
equivalent assets.  The portfolio was concentrated in residential real estate with 77% in 
residential B/C MBS, 8.17% in residential A MBS, and 0.44% in Agency MBS (Table no. 
6).  All concentrations were within allowable limits.  Thus although the securities were 
rated AAA or AA, the vast majority of them were backed by mortgages from less than 
prime borrowers (45% of the residential B/C securities were rated AAA, 55% AA).  The 
entire portfolio was U.S. based.  The portfolio was funded by $2.214 billion in CP, $333.93 
million in Tier 1 mezzanine notes, $174.28 in Tier 2 mezzanine notes, and $72.51 in junior 
capital notes.  The structure had passed all stress tests. 
Table no. 6:  Mainsail II Portfolio Composition July 31, 2007 
Structured Finance  US$ (mill) (book value)  % 
     
Residential B/C Mortgage Securities  1564.66  77.28% 
CDO Securities  210.5  10.40% 
CMBS Conduit Securities  75  3.70% 
Residential A Mortgage Securities  8.81  0.44% 
MBS Agency Securities  165.36  8.17% 
Cash  0.32  0.02% 
      
Total  2024.65  100.00% 
Source:  Mainsail II Investor Report, July 31, 2007. 
 
The  maturity  mismatch  is  substantial—the  assets  mature  in  years  and  the  liabilities  in 
weeks or months.  This maturity mismatch is supported by a liquidity facility of 30% of the 
CP and "the inherent liquidity of the underlying assets to repay maturing CP" (Euroweek, 
2006).  The liquidity facility is a commitment to lend to, or purchase assets from the SPV if 
funds  are  needed  to  repay  maturing  commercial  paper.    The  facility  is  provided  by 
Barclay’s.  The issue will wind-down early if any of a list of triggers is breached, including 
a market value coverage test (if the market value of the assets falls), a cash flow flow-out 
test, interest rate sensitivity tests, and currency sensitivity tests. 
 
4. A Prudent Investment? 
Thus  in  early  August  2007  the  Treasury  of  the  State  of  Maine  made  a  $20  million 
investment in ABCP rated the equivalent of AAA (P-1), the highest rating available.  This 
was a decision similar to thousands made by other institutional investors at this time.  The 
list of other municipalities which invested in Mainsail II demonstrates that Maine was not 
alone.  In the U.S. Connecticut, Florida, Montana, and Washington’s King County also 
invested  in  Mainsail  (Herbst-Bayliss,  2007).    In  addition,  the  California  Earthquake  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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Authority’s  (CEA)  investment  portfolio  had  $60  million  (of  a  $3.2  billion  portfolio) 
invested in Mainsail II (dBusinessNews, 2007). 
Despite the excellent company, was it a prudent investment?  The investment did meet the 
rating requirements of the governing statute and investment policy.  Commercial paper is 
an approved security, and this paper was highly rated and within all investment guidelines.  
However, those guidelines make no distinction between traditional corporate commercial 
paper  and  asset-backed  commercial  paper,  which  are  quite  different.    While  standard 
corporate commercial paper is issued by an ongoing firm with diverse assets, ABCP is 
issued by a limited purpose entity and backed only by the assets owned by the entity.  
Normally this is an acceptable arrangement,  unless there  is a liquidity crisis and those 
assets are not convertible into cash at anything close to the original value.  Further, it is 
clear that asset-backed commercial paper can vary quite a bit, from the ABCP conduit 
paper (with 100% liquidity facility) to SIV-Lite commercial paper.  That the Treasurer and 
perhaps his staff did not fully understand the particular characteristics of the investment is 
clear  from  the  Treasurer’s  remarks  in  December  2007,  where  he  chastises  the  broker 
Merrill Lynch for not indicating “that Mainsail was a structured investment vehicle which 
arbitrages between short-term and long-term debt” (Lemoine, 2007).  The Treasury also did 
not know that the assets of Mainsail II were primarily securities backed by pools of sub-
prime  mortgages.    It  could  be  argued  that  the  Treasury  staff  depended  on  the 
recommendation of Merrill Lynch along with the top ratings from the credit rating agencies 
without additional research or sufficient questions.  Clearly this was common among all 
types of investors in the investment environment prior to the August 2007 meltdown.  
Thus the Treasury Department made an investment in something it did not understand, 
depending instead on the input of others—its broker and the rating agencies.  There is fault 
there as well.  It is questionable whether Merrill Lynch should have been promoting such 
investments to conservative and possibly understaffed public entities.  In fact, by the end of 
2007 and into 2008 Merrill Lynch was the target of several investigations and potential 
lawsuits. The Wall Street Journal points out that “local governments usually lack the staff 
and  resources  to  make  informed  decisions  on  complex  instruments”  (Karmin,  2008).  
Because municipalities are relatively resource-restricted, governments potentially rely on 
their advisors and rating agencies to a greater degree than other large institutional investors 
and therefore may be more vulnerable.  As State Treasurer David Lemoine of Maine said: 
“We  relied  on  professional  advice  from  our  brokers  and  rating  agencies”  (Bel  Bruno, 
2007).  In this case it is clear that the broker was profiting from the sale of a security it 
should not have been selling to this client.  On August 14, 2008 the State of Maine filed a 
lawsuit against Merrill Lynch.  According to the lawsuit, Merrill was more than just selling 
inappropriate investments, it knew of troubles with Mainsail II and did not disclose them.  
It  had  identified  (internally)  Mainsail  II  as  “liquidity  challenged”  on  July  26,  2007, 
indicating Mainsail was having trouble selling new CP;  it had decided not to hold any 
Mainsail II in its own account;  it was able to place Mainsail II CP only overnight in most 
cases;  and it was now the only U.S. dealer of Mainsail II after the withdrawal of Morgan 
Stanley as a dealer.  (The complaint in the case was for securities fraud.)  
But even if the broker Merrill Lynch was at fault, the security was rated as prime by the 
rating agencies.  What role did the rating agency play?  The weakness of the rating agency 
approach is captured in the analysis done by S&P prior to the Mainsail II launch, in its Pre-
Sale Report that went to potential investors.  In it, S&P does an admirable job of explaining AE  Prudent Intesting? The Credit Crisis of August 2007 Mainsail II Siv-Lite, and the 
State Cash Investment Pool 
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the strengths of the structure (highly rated asset criteria, adequate credit support by the 
subordinate notes, and a risk model that measures the risk of the portfolio using Monte 
Carlo simulation techniques.)  It raises a list of potential concerns (market risk, event risk, 
currency risk, active management trading, and potential diversion of cash flows) but one by 
one finds the concerns effectively addressed in the issue’s structure and policies.   
However, the weakness of S&P’s analysis, and the weakness when creating the structure, 
was  a  reliance  on  a  risk  modeling  system  predicated  on  historical  data  (“The  Model’s 
assumptions  have  been  calibrated  based  on  stressed  historical  data”  says  S&P)  and 
concerned with interest rate shocks and rating changes (S&P, 2006).  S&P didn’t conceive 
of, perhaps couldn’t conceive of an entire market (ABCP) drying up virtually overnight. 
Business Week says that the odds of a bond going from AAA to CCC in a year is 1 in 
10,000, but that happened twice on August 21, 2007 (all quotation is this paragraph are 
from Henry, 2007).  Prices fell by a “magnitude 10 to 15 times greater than any time on 
record.”  Paul Kerlogue of Moody’s said “We’ve never seen anything like it in structured 
finance.  Things just behaved in a way that we were not able to predict.”  S&P added in a 
written statement to Business Week, “Our original ratings were based on the best available 
data at the time.”  In addition, the rating agencies apparently didn’t understand the new 
dynamics of the SIV-Lite structure and the changing characteristics of mortgage bonds in 
2007—backed  by  more  adjustable  rate  and  subprime  mortgages  and  backed  by  homes 
whose prices had recently run-up.  Janet Tavakoli of Tavakoli Structured Finance sums it 
up:  “They  were  looking  at  historical  data  in  a  brand  new  ball  game  with  brand  new 
products.”  
Was this prudent investing?  Because all of the guidelines were met it was an allowable 
investment.  It was typical investing.  The state Treasury purchased this paper because it 
had a top rating but delivered a return in excess of Treasury.  But it was not prudent.  There 
was a lack of  understanding of the investment and an over-reliance on ratings and the 
broker.    A  basic  rule  of  investing  is  to  understand  your  investment.    As  the  previous 
discussion makes clear, a SIV-Lite as well as the other structured credit vehicles (CDO, 
SIV, Conduit) are complicated structures and the risks are not easily assessed.  There were 
ample warnings prior to August 2007 about problems in the mortgage markets and the 
effects this could have on mortgage related securities.
10  Clearly Merrill Lynch should not 
have been selling ABCP from a structure like Mainsail II without explaining the underlying 
collateral and the structural maturity mismatch.  And the rating agencies failed to correctly 
model and assess the risks of these securities.  Had any one of these parties—the investor, 




This paper reviews the period leading up to and including the credit disruption of August 
2007 and then examines one failed structured finance issue and one investor in that issue.  
The  investor  was  a  financially  conservative  state  investment  portfolio  and  the  issue, 
                                                 
10 Just one academic example:  Mason and Rosner presented a paper on February 15, 2007 to the 
Hudson Institute in which they said:  “Our findings imply that even investment grade rated CDOs will 
experience significant losses if home prices depreciate.”  
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Mainsail  II,  a  little-known  esoteric  structure  known  as  a  SIV-Lite.    The  fact  that  this 
investor was buying a security from this issuer tells us much about the excesses of the 
markets at that time and the lack of investment discipline. 
New regulations in the market and new investment policies for the portfolio are surely 
needed,  but  it  is  also  clear  that  regulations  cannot  prevent  all  bad  investments  and  all 
complicated, hard-to-understand issues.  The brokers must better match the needs of their 
clients with potential investments and rating agencies must better model and assess the 
risks of those investments.  But regulation and policy cannot cover all possibilities, nor can 
a rating, and there is a responsibility by the investor to understand the investments and 
perform sufficient due diligence.   
The Treasurer in fact did immediately form a new advisory  group, the  State of Maine 
Treasurer's Cash Pool Investment Design Committee, to review the investment policies and 
the relevant State statutes and suggest revisions. A new investment policy was approved by 
mid-2008.  A permanent advisory committee, the State of Maine Treasurer's Cash Pool 
Investment  Advisory  Committee,  was  formed  to  advise  the  Treasury  and  review  the 
portfolio.  The author of this article serves on both committees.  An investment consultant, 
PFM Asset Management, was hired to provide advice only (it will not profit from any 
transactions). 
In  April  2008,  KPMG  was  appointed  to  put  the  Mainsail  II  investment  vehicle  into 
receivership.  Investors in the lower ranking securities (mezzanine notes and capital notes) 
lost  their  entire  investment.    Goldman  Sachs  completed  an  auction  of  the  remaining 
Mainsail II assets in September 2008, reportedly averaging 21 cents on the dollar.
11  ABCP 
outstanding, after hitting its high in August 2007 at $1,173.4 billion, dropped continuously 
and stood at $572.6 billion as of June 2009 (SIFMA, 2009). 
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Appendix:  Mainsail II in Receivership (Portfolio Assets 2008) 
CDOS: 
ACA AQUARIUS 2006-1 ABS CDO  AE  Prudent Intesting? The Credit Crisis of August 2007 Mainsail II Siv-Lite, and the 
State Cash Investment Pool 
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CAMBER 5 ABS CDO; CAMBER 7 ABS CDO  
DIVERSEY HARBOR ABS CDO 
DUKE FUNDING HIGH GRADE IV ABS CDO 
FAB 2006 ABS CDO 
HIGHGAGTE ABS CDO  
HOUT BAY 2006-1 ABS CDO 
KLEROS PREFERRED FUNDING ABS CDO  
PLETTENBERG BAYABS CDO 
RIDGEWAY COURT FUNDING ABS CDO 
SCORPIUS ABS CDO 
TAZLINA FUNDING CDO ABS 
JER CRE CDO 2006-2 CRE CDO 
MARATHON REAL ESTATE CDO 2006-1 CRE CDO 
MESA WEST CDO 2007-1 CRE CDO 
 
ALT-A MORTGAGE RELATED: 
CWABS ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES TRUST 2006-ABC1 RMBS  ALT-A 
DEUTSCHE  ALT-A  SECURITIES  MORTGAGE  LOAN  TRUST,  SERIES  2007-AR2 
RMBS ALT-A 
GSAA HOME EQUITY TRUST 2006-11 RMBS ALT-A;  2006-14 RMBS ALT-A; 2006-
16  RMBS  ALT-A;  2006-17  RMBS  ALT-A;  2006-3  RMBS  ALT-A;  2006-9 
RMBS ALT-A; 2006-2 RMBS ALT-A; 2006-2 RMBS ALT-A 
LUMINENT MORTGAGE TRUST 2005-1 RMBS ALT-A 
MERRILL LYNCH MORTGAGE INVESTORS TRUST SERIES 2005-A8 RMBS ALT-A  
STRUCTURED ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION SERIES 2006-2 RMBS PRIME; 
2006-4 RMBS PRIME 
WACHOVIA MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST SERIES 2006-AMN1 RMBS ALT-A 
WELLS FARGO ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2005 - 02 RMBS ALT-A 
 
SUB-PRIME MORTGAGE RELATED: 
ACE SECURITIES CORP, HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2007-WM1 RMBS 
SUB-PRIME 
AAMES MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUST 2006-1 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC. 2005-R10 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
BEAR  STEARNS  ASSET-BACKED  CERTIFICATES,  SERIES  2005-HE111  RMBS 
SUB-PRIME 
C-BASS MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006 CB8 
RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  SERIES  2006  CB1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  SERIES  2006-
CB3  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  SERIES  2006-CB4  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  SERIES 
2006 CB5 RMBS SUB-PRIME; SERIES 2006 CB8 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
CWABS  ASSET-BACKED  CERTIFICATES  TRUST  2005-14  RMBS  SUB-PRIME; 
2006-18 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-BC2 RMBS SUB-PRIME  
FBR SECURITIZATION TRUST 2005-4 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
FFMLT TRUST 2005-FF11 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
FIRST FRANKLIN MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2005-FF5 RMBS SUB-PRIME ; 2006-
FF11  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006FF13  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-FF6  RMBS 
SUB-PRIME;  2006-FF9  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2007-FF1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME; 
2007-FF2 RMBS SUB-PRIME  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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FREMONT HOME LOAN TRUST 2005-D RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-1 RMBS SUB-
PRIME 
GE-WMC ASSET-BACKED PASS-THROUGH TRUST, SERIES 2006-1 RMBS SUB-
PRIME 
GSAMP TRUST 2005-HE5 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-FM2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-
HE2  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-HE3  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-HE6  RMBS 
SUB-PRIME; 2006-NC2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2007-FM2 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
HSI ASSET SECURITIZATION CORP TRUST 2006-HE1 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-
HE2 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
IXIS MOR CAP TR 2005-HE4 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
IXIS  REAL  ESTATE  CAPITAL  TRUST  2006-HE2  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-HE3 
RMBS SUB-PRIME 
J.P. MORGAN MORTGAGE  ACQUISITION CORP. 2006-CW1 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 
2006-FRE1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-FRE2  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-HE1 
RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-HE2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-NC1 RMBS SUB-
PRIME;  2006-RM1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-WMC1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME; 
2006-WMC2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-WMC3 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2005-WL3 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-1 
RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-7 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 
2006-WL2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-WL3 RMBS SUB-PRIME  
MASTR ASSET BACKED SECURITIES TRUST 2005-FRE1 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2005-
NC2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-FRE2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-WMC1 RMBS 
SUB-PRIME; 2006-WMC2 RMBS SUB-PRIME  
MERRILL  LYNCH  MORTGAGE  INVESTORS  TRUST,  SERIES  2006-HE4  RMBS 
SUB-PRIME; 2006-RM1 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-RM2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 
2006-RM5 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
MERITAGE  MORT  LOAN  TRUST  2005-3,  AS-BKD  CERT  SERIES  2005-3  RMBS 
SUB-PRIME; 2005-3, AS-BKD CERT SERIES 2005-3 RMBS SUB-PRIME  
MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I INC. TRUST 2005-HE5 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 
2006-HE1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-HE2  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-HE3 
RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-HE4 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-HE7 RMBS SUB-
PRIME; 2006-NC1 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-NC2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-
NC3 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-NC4 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-WMC2 RMBS 
SUB-PRIME; 2007-NC1 RMBS SUB-PRIME  
MORGAN STANLEY HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST 2006-2 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
NOVASTAR MORTGAGE FUNDING TRUST, SERIES 2006-1 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
NOMURA  HOME  EQUITY  LOAN  TRUST,  SERIES  2005-HE1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME; 
2006-FM1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-HE1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-HE1 
RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-HE2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-HE2 RMBS SUB-
PRIME 
OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, 
SERIES 2006-1 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
OWNIT  MORTGAGE  LOAN  TRUST,  SERIES  2006-1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-2 
RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-3 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-5 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES LLC TRUST 2006-FR2 RMBS SUB-
PRIME; 2006-WM2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2007-HE1 RMBS SUB-PRIME 
STRUCTURED  ASSET  INVESTMENT  LOAN  TRUST  2006-3  RMBS  SUB-PRIME; 
2006-BNC1 RMBS SUB-PRIME AE  Prudent Intesting? The Credit Crisis of August 2007 Mainsail II Siv-Lite, and the 
State Cash Investment Pool 
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STRUCTURED  ASSET  SECURITIES  CORPORATION  (SASCO)  2006  -  BC1  RMBS 
SUB-PRIME 
SG  MORTGAGE  SECURITIES  TRUST  2006-FRE1  RMBS  SUB-PRIME;  2006-FRE2 
RMBS SUB-PRIME  
SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2006-2 RMBS SUB-PRIME; 2006-OPT3 RMBS 
SUB-PRIME  
WELLS  FARGO  HOME  EQUITY  ASSET-BACKED  SECURITIES  2006-1  TRUST 
RMBS SUB-PRIME 
 
Source:  Provided by KPMG, receiver of Mainsail II.  Multiple issues (series) by the same 
sponsor are separated by a semi-colon. 